http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zORv8wwiadQ&feature=related

Check out this video on what I think is Pascal's wager applied to global warming vs. actions taken towards it.
I say "I think" because I kind of stopped watching the video once I saw the squares.


Do you guys find it as shocking as I do that this guy is getting all this attention (the 4 million+ views) for simply applying an old idea to a topic more relevant to today's world?

Basic beliefs

As you guys might have gathered, the key point on which Plantinga's argument rests is the idea of a basic belief. Recall that a belief is basic if you don't need to rely on other beliefs to justify it. Plantinga thinks that beliefs like 'God is speaking to me' are basic in the same way that 'I see a tree' is basic.

Do you think these examples are analogous? Why or why not?

Davis and Juhl on fine-tuning

Last week, we saw Davis give an argument for intelligent design based on the notion of 'fine-tuning'. Davis thinks that the fact that the physical constants of our universe are very precisely matched to allow life to function is surprising and needs to be explained.

But Cory Juhl argues in his paper that we should not find the evidence for fine-tuning surprising. He says that fine-tuning in the physical laws is to be expected once we know that life is 'causally ramified'. What does he mean by 'causally ramified'? How does he use this idea to argue his point?

Pascal's Wager

Since we didn't manage to get to Pascal's Wager in tutorial on Friday, I thought it might be a good idea to get some discussion about it going here.

To summarize, the 'Pascal's Wager' argument goes as follows:
1. Either God exists or does not exist.
2. You can either wager for God's existence, or wager against it.
3. If you wager for God's existence, and God exists, then you gain infinite happiness.
4. In any other outcome, your gain or loss is only finite.
5. So, you should wager for God's existence. (Since rationality requires choosing the possibility of infinite gain to any finite possibility)

One of the key assumptions in Pascal's argument that Brad highlighted in lecture is the idea that one can voluntarily form beliefs. That is, believing in something is basically a matter of having a strong enough will to believe. This strikes some people as odd. Some people have objected that it is not at all obvious that we can simply choose to have any beliefs we want. Do you grant Pascal the assumption that forming beliefs is a matter of willing?

There are other ways one could object to Pascal. To what extent, for example, does the argument depend on an assumption about the likelihood of God's existence? If the probability is thought to be really really small, would it still be rational to wager on God? Does it even make sense to talk about the probability of God's existence?

Welcome to Phil 101

Welcome to the Phil 101 blog! This is a place for us to discuss the material covered in lectures and in tutorials. Feel free to share thoughts, raise questions and respond to each others' ideas. I will check in every now and then to join in the discussion. From time to time, I will also post questions to think about as you work through the readings. Happy philosophizing!